It is
now more than two weeks since the Grenfell Tower fire disaster, and I am still
very, very angry.
The
people who died that night should not have died. They need not have died. They
died because over several decades, successive governments presided over a
progressive weakening of regulation and inspection systems that they knew would
one day lead to tragedy.
How
did they know? Because they had been warned -- not once, not twice, but again
and again, by fire officers, buildings inspectors, MPs, insurers, everyone who
knew anything at all about fire safety.
In
Scotland, after a man died in a tower block fire in 1999, the rules on
permissible building materials were changed and the inspection regime
tightened. Was the same done in England? It was not.
In
2013, after six people died in a tower block fire in London, a coroner
recommended a review of fire safety regulations 'with particular regard to the
spread of fire over the external envelope of a building'. Was a review carried
out? It was not.
I hope no one will dare ever again to mock
health and safety rules. They save lives. And although tearing up 'red tape' is
always good for an easy headline, it can lead directly to the appalling sight
of the charred remains of Grenfell Tower.
But
here's what angers me most -- and bear with me, because it gets a bit
technical. The cladding panels which were bolted to the outside of Grenfell
Tower last year to improve the insulation of the building (and thereby reduce
tenants' heating bills and energy consumption) were a 'multicomponent
rainscreen cladding system' made up of an insulating core, marketed as Celotex
RS5000, and exterior decorative cladding, made of aluminium sheets, sold as
Reynobond PE.
But
the company that makes the panels says in its marketing material that the
version used on Grenfell Tower is suitable only for buildings no more than 10
metres high. (Grenfell Tower is 67 metres high.) It makes two other versions --
one that is fire-resistant, and one that is non-combustible -- for higher
buildings. So someone, somewhere, ordered the wrong version.
Knowingly,
or unknowingly? To save money, or because they didn't know the difference? Questions
for the public inquiry. (The Times reports
that internal emails suggest the cheaper version was chosen deliberately to
keep costs down, saving £293,368 on an £8.6 million refurbishment programme.)
What's
more, someone else checked the panels' specifications, and said: 'Yeah, fine.
No problem. Go ahead.'
Knowingly,
or unknowingly? Another question for the public inquiry.
The
prime minister said in the House of Commons on Wednesday that the Grenfell
Tower cladding was 'non-compliant' with current building regulations. (So, it
seems, is the cladding on every other tower block in England.) But two of the
key issues for the inquiry will be to ascertain whether the testing processes
used to certify building materials are adequate, and how well qualified are the
inspectors who approve them. There are also suggestions that the relevant
regulations are now so opaque that no one can be exactly sure what is, and is
not, permissible.
I have
spent a lot of time in hotels during my time as a journalist -- and the vast
majority of them were equipped, thank goodness, with fire doors, smoke alarms
and sprinkler systems. The same goes for office blocks, of course -- so why are
the rules different for tower blocks? I think we know the answer ...
All
tower blocks built after 2007 have to be fitted with sprinkler systems. But
older blocks don't have to be retro-fitted. There can be only one explanation:
to save money. And there can be only one conclusion: saving money matters more
than saving lives. Tens of thousands -- perhaps hundreds of thousands -- of
people go to sleep every night in over-crowded, sub-standard homes that are
just one faulty fridge away from being death traps. (Interesting fact: the
Conservative-run Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, which owns Grenfell
Tower, currently has a £274 million surplus sitting in the bank.)
The
Grenfell Tower disaster was not an unavoidable accident. It was avoidable. And
it wasn't an accident. It was the result of culpable, criminal negligence.
I just
hope that the survivors and the relatives and friends of all those who died --
and we will probably never know for sure exactly how many perished -- will not
have to wait 28 years for justice to be done, as have the families affected by
the Hillsborough stadium disaster of 1989.
And I
hope that Sir Martin Moore-Bick, the retired judge who will be chairing the
public inquiry, is up to the task he has been given. He will need to be utterly
fearless and ruthlessly determined. And he must be prepared to apportion blame.